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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
Civil Code and Related Subjects
PERSONS
Harold J. Brouillette*
MARRIAGE
In Succession of Verrett' appellant claimed to be the putative
wife of the decedent. Their marriage was null because the dece-
dent had been validly wed before the alleged putative marriage.
The children of the valid marriage opposed appellant's claim on
the ground that the good faith required by Article 1172 had not
been shown; they attempted to show that the appellant knew
that their father was married at the time the alleged putative
marriage was performed. The court stated the well-established
rule that the burden of proof rests on the party who alleges bad
faith and found that the burden had not been met in this case.3
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION FROm BED AND BOARD
Adultery
The court in Hayes v. Hayes4 held that the evidence did not
warrant the district court's finding that the defendant wife had
committed adultery. The only evidence was the testimony of
private investigators who had been hired by the suspicious hus-
band to "shadow" his wife. They testified that she visited the
alleged corespondent at his apartment on two occasions and met
him at a cocktail lounge on another. The court said that when
evidence of adultery is circumstantial "the circumstantial proof
... must be so convincing as to exclude any other reasonable
hypothesis but that of guilt."5 In Humes v. McIntosh6 the defen-
dant husband who admitted acts of adultery met the burden of
proving that his wife continued marital relations with him after
knowledge of those acts. Under the jurisprudence, a continuance
* Member, Louisiana Bar.
1. 224 La. 461, 70 So.2d 89 (1953).
2. Art. 117, LA. CIVM CODE of 1870: "The marriage, which has been de-
clared null, produces nevertheless its civil effects as it relates to the parties
and their children, if it has been contracted in good faith."
3. For a discussion of the requirements necessary to prove a putative
marriage, see Note, 22 TULANE L. REV. 340 (1947).
4. 225 La. 374, 73 So.2d 179 (1954).
5. 73 So.2d at 180.
6. 74 So.2d 167 (La. 1954).
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of the marital relation after knowledge by the injured party of
the acts of infidelity is a valid defense to an action for divorce
based on those acts.7
Recrimination and Comparative Rectitude
The doctrine of recrimination in divorce law requires the
denial of relief if the complainant has been guilty of conduct
which would entitle the other spouse to a divorce.8 Some states
have modified this rule in favor of the so-called "comparative
rectitude" doctrine under which the relative faults of the parties
are weighed and the divorce is granted to the spouse guilty of
the least fault though the other has been guilty of conduct which
is ground for divorce.9 This doctrine has been recognized and
adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court both by implication 0
and expressly." In Callahan v. Callais12 the court noted its accep-
tance of the doctrine and after carefully reviewing the evidence
presented, concluded that the comparative faults of the parties
were equal and denied relief to both the husband, who sought
separation from bed and board on grounds of abandonment, and
to the wife who had reconvened on grounds of cruel treatment.
It has been suggested that in cases of this nature, if the real issue
is the advisability of continuing a personal relationship, mutual
fault should increase rather than decrease the justification for
granting a separation. 13
Dejoie v. Dejoie14 was decided on questions of fact, the court
finding that the husband had sufficient reason for having aban-
doned the marital domicile, namely, the wife's cruel treatment
under Article 138 of the Civil Code.
7. Adams v. Adams, 196 La. 464, 199 So. 392 (1940); Spence v. Spence,
162 La. 4, 110 So. 68 (1926); Cooper v. Cooper, 10 La. 249 (1836).
8. 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 10.01 (2d ed. 1945). For an exten-
sive discussion of the doctrine of recrimination, see Bradway, The Myth of
the Innocent Spouse, 11 TULANE L. REV. 377 (1937).
9. 1 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 10.03 (2d ed. 1945). See also
Comment, A Comparison of Recrimination and the Doctrine of Comparative
Rectitude and their Incidents, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 55 (1950).
10. Temperance v. Herrmann, 191 La. 696, 186 So. 73 (1938); Gormley v.
Gormley, 161 La. 121, 108 So. 307 (1926).
11. Callahan v. Callais, 224 La. 901, 71 So.2d 320 (1954); Eals v. Swan,
221 La. 329, 59 So.2d 409 (1952).
12. 224 La. 901, 71 So.2d 320 (1954).
13. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-
Persons, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 253, 254 (1953).
14. 224 La. 611, 70 So.2d 398 (1954).
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ALIMONY
Article 232 provides that when circumstances warrant a
discharge from the obligation of paying alimony or a reduction
in the amount being paid, "the discharge from or reduction of
the alimony may be sued for and granted." But it is well settled
that an alimony judgment is the property of the person to whom
granted and as to alimony past due, it cannot be altered or
annulled.15 In Pisciotto v. Crucia6 the defendant stopped making
the alimony payments without getting a discharge from the
court. After 162 weekly payments had been missed, the plaintiff
brought an action for a lump sum judgment. The defendant
alleged that the payments had been waived by the plaintiff's
failure to complain timely. The court followed a line of juris-
prudence holding that the failure to protest periodically does
not waive payment of alimony.' 7 The defendant's plea of pre-
scription based on Article 3538 was maintained as to payments
due for more than three years, thus reducing the judgment to
the total due for 156 weeks.
In Hillard v. Hillard'8 the court, reversing the district court
decision, applied the well-established rule that the duty of a
husband to pay ailmony pendente lite is not dependent upon the
grounds for or the outcome of the suit for separation from bed
and board or divorce. The judgment of the district court denying
the alimony was rendered at the same time as the decree grant-
ing the husband a separation on grounds of abandonment, and
on appeal Justice McCaleb dissented saying that, since Article
148 authorizes alimony only "pending the suit for separation
from bed and board or for divorce," when a final judgment of
separation from bed and board has already been rendered "there
is no statutory sanction for the continuance of the alimony
pendente lite."'19
Only two other cases involved alimony and their decisions
were based on questions of fact; one concerned the sufficiency
of evidence to prove that the ex-wife had sufficient means for
15. Art. 548, LA. CODE OF PRAcTICE of 1870; Williams v. Williams, 211 La.
939, 31 So.2d 170 (1947); Snow v. Snow, 188 La. 660, 177 So. 793 (1937).
16. 224 La. 802, 71 So.2d 226 (1954).
17. Gehrkin v. Gehrkin, 216 La. 950, 45 So.2d 89 (1950); Wainwright v.
Wainwright, 217 La. 563, 46 So.2d 902 (1950), 25 TULANE L. REv. 264 (1951).
For a discussion of the question of waiver of alimony payments, see The
Work of the Lou4siana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term-Persons, 11
LOUISIANA LAw Ramw 173, 174 (1951).
18. 225 La. 507, 73 So.2d 442 (1954).
19. 73 So.2d at 446.
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her maintenance, 20 and the other the sufficiency of the evidence
to prove that the ex-husband was able to pay the amount of
alimony awarded by the district court.21
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
Criminal Neglect of Family
The question of a father's liability to support his illegitimate
children has caused no little difficulty in Louisiana. Article 74
of the Criminal Code imposes penal sanctions on parents for
failure to support their children, both legitimate and illegitimate.
The legislature's amendments to this article and the court's inter-
pretation of these amendments have received extensive com-
mentary in this Review.2 2 Two cases decided during the last
term, State v. Lemoine;3 and State v. Mack,24 indicate that this
area of our law continues to be a troublesome one.
Article 923
In Succession of Wesley 25 the court was required to deter-
mine whether or not a legitimate child can have "natural brothers
20. Brown v. Harris, 225 La. 320, 72 So.2d 746 (1954).
21. John v. John, 224 La. 426, 69 So.2d 737 (1953).
22. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW RVIEw 301 (1952); Louisiana Legis-
lation of 1952, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 21, 59-60 (1952); The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term--Persons, 13 LOUISiANA LAW
REVIEw 253, 261 (1953); Louisiana Legislation of 1954-Criminal Law and
Procedure, and Penal Institutions, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 59 (1954); Note,
14 LOUTsIANA LAW REvIEw 898 (1954).
23. 224 La. 200, 69 So.2d 15 (1953). In 1950, Article 74 of the Criminal
Code, which provides that failure to support a wife or child is a crime, was
extended to require support of illegitimate children. State v. Randall, 219 La.
578, 53 So.2d 689 (1951), presented the question of whether the state could
introduce, in a prosecution under this article, evidence to show that the
defendant was the father of a child when the mother was legally married
to someone else. The court held that such evidence was not admissible be-
cause the right to contest the legitimacy of a child born of a married woman
is reserved to her husband who may disavow the child only by an action en
ddsaveu and within certain delay periods as prescribed by Articles 184-191
of the Civil Code. The legislature, by Act 368 of 1952, again amended Crimi-
nal Code Article 74, this time to provide that "in case of an illegitimate
child" evidence is admissible to prove paternity for purposes of criminal
prosecution but that "such evidence shall not be construed as establishing
any civil obligation." State v. Lemoine presented the same problem as the
Randall case and the state contended that the 1952 amendment permitted
such evidence. The court held that the Randall case was controlling and
that the 1952 amendment did not change its rule because those provisions
applied only to the case of illegitimate children and the child in the
Lemoine case was, by irrebutable presumption, the legitimate child of the
mother's husband.
It is noteworthy that one writer had suggested that the rule of the
Randall case had not been changed by the 1952 amendment. See The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-Person8, 13 LOuIsI-
ANA LAW REVIEW 253, 262, n. 36 (1953).
24. 224 La. 886, 71 So.2d 315 (1954), 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 898.
25. 224 La. 182, 69 So.2d 8 (1953).
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and sisters." The decedent was the acknowledged illegitimate
son of the claimant's legitimate mother and the claimant alleged
inheritance rights under Article 923 which provides:
"If the father and mother of the natural child died
before him, the estate of such natural child shall pass to
his natural brothers and sisters, or to their descendants."
The court held that "natural brothers and sisters" means the
other natural children of the same father or the same mother,
thus negativing the possibility of a legitimate person acquiring
that status.26
Proof of Paternity
Article 210 provides that the paternity of an illegitimate child
may be proved by the oath of the mother if she is not a woman
"of dissolute manners" and if she has never had an "unlawful
connection" with any man other than the accused. In Rousseau
v. Bartell27 the mother testified that on one occasion she un-
successfully attempted intercourse with another man and the
court held that this did not constitute an "unlawful connection"
and that her oath that the defendant was the father of the child
was a proper basis for a judgment declaring him such. This case
is treated fully elsewhere in this Review.23
CUSTODY
In Cannon v. Cannon29 the district court refused to grant
custody of two minor children to their mother for the reason
that the home where she resided was small and inadequate as
compared with the one provided by the father, which was the
home of the paternal aunt of the child. The father .had been
granted custody with the wife's consent at the earlier divorce
proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed stating "it is to the
welfare and best interest of young children that the mother be
awarded their custody unless she is shown to be morally unfit
or otherwise unsuitable [citing authorities]."0
26. For a discussion of the difficulties encountered in the use of the
term "natural child," see Note, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 221 (1954).
27. 224 La. 601, 70 So.2d 394 (1954).
28. See Note, 15 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 218 (1954).
29. 74 So.2d 147 (La. 1954).
30. Id. at 148.
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Three other cases involved child custody, two being litigated
on questions of procedure,31 and the third concerned a conflict
of laws problem.82
ADOPTION
Where a person by an act of adoption acquires the status of
a forced heir of the adoptive parents, is that status lost as to
those parents by a subsequent adoption of the same person by
different parents? The court in Succession of Gambino33 an-
swered that question in the negative. Discussing the legal rights
and obligations resulting from adoption, the court said that
Article 214 of the Civil Code is "the substantive law on this
subject. 3 4 and that "this article does not provide how this
relationship once created can be undone."3 Section 13 of Act
428 of 1938, which was in effect at the time of the second act of
adoption, would have, if valid, led to a different result. It pro-
vided: "Upon the entry of the final order of adoption, the said
child shall cease to be heir of its parents." But the court agreed
with the district court holding that the provision was violative of
Article III, Section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 in
that it dealt with substantive matters not indicated in its title.
The title indicated that the act dealt only with the method and
procedure of adoption.
In the only other case of the term involving adoption, Suc-
cession of Williams,8 the court held that a notarial act of adop-
tion which was not in accordance with the law in effect at the
time of its execution had been rendered valid by Act 46 of 1932
which "confirmed, approved, and validated" prior acts of adop-
tion.37
31. Bernard v. Bernard, 224 La. 83, 68 So.2d 766 (1953); D'Antoni v. Geraci,
224 La. 818, 70 So.2d 883 (1954).
32. Francis v. Carpenter, 224 La. 916, 71 So.2d 326 (1954). See discussion
of this case in the Conflict of Laws section of the symposium, page 299
infra.
33. 225 La. 674, 73 So.2d 800 (1954).
34. 73 So.2d at 803.
35. Ibid.
36. 224 La. 871, 71 So.2d 229 (1954).
37. La. Acts 1872, No. 31, p. 79, as amended by La. Acts 1924, No. 48, p.
76, was in effect at the time of the act of adoption (1928) and La. Acts 1932,
No. 46, p. 239, "confirmed, approved, and validated" prior acts of adoption.
The 1932 act was superseded by La. Acts 1940, No. 241, p. 992.
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